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1963] NOTES
quently, it seems possible for an heir to accept after the thirty-
year prescriptive period. 19 Subsequent cases have followed this
interpretation .2
Edwards v. Smith represents a reversion to the Generes in-
terpretation by holding Article 1030 inapplicable to regular
heirs.2 1 Citing only a pre-Sun Oil case, 22 the court apparently
failed to consider the more recent interpretations by the Su-
preme Court.23 The instant case's interpretation of Article 1030
seems clearly erroneous because in conflict with that of Sun Oil
and its progeny. However, since the instant decision could have
been decided without reference to Article 1030 - plaintiff failed
to establish her capacity of forced heirship- the instant case
should not detract from the Sun Oil interpretation.2 4
John T. McMahon
TORTS - DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Defendant intentionally shot a mare, owned by plaintiff's
son, to frighten it away from his yard. The next morning plain-
19. Since creditors can force heirs to accept or renounce after thirty days of
the succession's opening, it is submitted that renunciation of a succession after
thirty years from its opening is unlikely due to the improbability of a succession's
owing debts at that late date. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1050-1055 (1870).
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that LA. R.S. 9:5682 (Supp. 1960), not
applicable in Edwards, provides that an heir or legatee who has not been recog-
nized as such in a judgment of possession may not assert any rights against suc-
cession property acquired by a third person from an heir or legatee who has been
so recognized, if such third person has possessed continuously and peaceably for
ten years from the registry of the judgment of possession.
20. Succession of Lapene, 233 La. 129, 96 So. 2d 321 (1957) ; Succession of
Seals, 142 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). Cf. Mestayer v. Cities Service
Development Co., 136 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
21. It is submitted that the court inadvertently used the term "forced" heir
rather than "regular" heir.
22. 147 So. 2d at 423: "It is the firmly established jurisprudence that forced
heirs do not lose by prescription their right of inheritance in failing to accept the
succession within thirty years because, if they have not renounced it, they are
presumed to have accepted it. Le mort saisit le vif. Dileo v. Dileo, 217 La. 103,
107, 46 So.2d 53, 56 (1950)."
23. See note 15 supra.
24. It must be noted that Edwards is a court of appeal decision, whereas Sun
Oil was rendered by the Supreme Court. Moreover, it is submitted that the Sun
Oil interpretation premised upon the existence of a single option to accept or
reject in all cases is the preferable interpretation, permitting a just and workable
solution while avoiding the harsh French rule which makes all inactive heirs
stranger to the succession after the lapse of thirty years. In any event, it would
seem that stability in the law requires the Louisiana courts to consistently adhere
to one interpretation.
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tiff's son discovered the mare was suffering. The trial court
allowed plaintiff to recover $100.00 on behalf of his minor son
as damages for shock and mental anguish experienced. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed and increased the
award of the damages. Held, an award of $250.00 for shock
and mental anguish sustained by a minor resulting from ob-
serving the pain and suffering of his horse was justified on
showing close attachment, fondness, and affection of the minor
for his horse. Brown v. Crocker, 139 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962).
In recent years courts have tended to recognize intentional
infliction of mental or emotional disturbance as a separate tort.'
This tort is in a process of growth; its ultimate limits have not
yet been determined.2 Indicative of this growth is Section 46 of
The Restatement of Torts, amended in 1948, to provide that one
who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe
emotional distress to another is liable for such emotional dis-
tress, and for bodily harm resulting therefrom.3 Recovery for
mental anguish has generally been limited to instances of out-
rageous conduct directed at, or in the presence of, the plaintiff
under circumstances in which the wrongdoer was considered as
intentionally or recklessly causing the mental anguish.4  Out-
1. PROSSER, TORTS § 11 (2d ed. 1955). The progress of the law may be
traced in the following series of articles: Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury
Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 41 AM. L. REG.(N.S.) 141 (1902) ;
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HAReV. L. REV. 260 (1921), 57 Am. L.
REV. 828 (1923) ; Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH.
L. REV. 497 (1922) ; Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability in Pennsylvania for Physical
Effects of Fright, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 627 (1932) ; Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability
in New York for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance, 32 COLUM.
L. REV. 409 (1932); Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from
Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REV. 253 (1933) ; Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A Mile-
post in the Law, 12 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1933) ; Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L.
REv. 761, 873 (1933) ; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936) ; Harper & McNeely, A Re-examination
of the Basis for Liability for Emotioal Disturbance, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426.
2. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957). So fluid is the law
in this area that the 1948 draft of Section 46 has already been modified by the
1957 draft. See note 3 infra, and accompanying text.
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46, amendment at V (student ed. 1950). The 1957
draft of Section 46 provides: "(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject
to liability for emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from it. (2)
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability
if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another who
is present at the time." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
It should be noted this is the first time the Restatement has recognized the pos-
sibility of a third person being allowed emotional damages for an act directed at
another. Id. § 46(2).
4. See notes 5-16 infra, and accompanying text.
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rageous conduct has been defined as that which would arouse
resentment in an average member of the community and lead
him to exclaim "Outrageous! '" 5 People are expected to bear
mere abuse without circumstances of aggravation, as it is not
considered as being outrageous. The outrageous element of re-
covery was illustrated by a Louisiana case allowing damages to
an elderly woman deceived into digging up a buried pot, sup-
posed to be gold, under circumstances of extreme public humilia-
tion.6
Emotional distress when it takes the form of grief, sorrow,
or disappointment 7 has been approached cautiously by the
courts.8 Recovery has usually been denied unless the defendant
at the time of his wrongdoing was in possession of facts indi-
cating a particular likelihood that grief, sorrow, or disappoint-
ment would result from his act.9 The requirement of special
5. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 46, comment d at 22 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1957) : "It has not been enough that defendant has acted with an
intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emo-
tional distress. . . . Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts
to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim "Outrageous !"
6. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
7. Emotional distress covers various states. Illustrative are mental anguish,
grief, sorrow, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, mortification, anger, chagrin,
disappointment, worry, and nausea. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46, comment f at VI
(student ed. 1950).
8. In numerous cases the Louisiana courts have denied recovery for grief,
sorrow, and disappointment when it is caused by the injury to a loved one. E.g.,
Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906) ; Black v. The Carrollton R.R.,
10 La. Ann. 33 (1855) ; Vinet v. Checker Cab Co., 140 So. 2d 252 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) ; Honeycutt v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 126 So. 2d 789 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1961) Covey v. Marquette Cas. Co., 84 So. 2d 217 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1956) ; Hughes v. Gill, 41 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949) ; Davis v. Con-
solidated Underwriters, 14 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) ; Seligman v.
Holiday, 154 So. 481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) ; Alston v. Cooly, 5 La. App. 623
(1st Cir. 1927) ; Barrere v. Schuber, 5 La. App. 67 (Orl. Cir. 1926) ; Knox v.
Allen, 4 La. App. 223 (2d Cir. 1926) ; cf. Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 473 (1963).
9. An example of one court's reasoning which allowed recovery is found in
Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961),
23 LA. L. REV. 473 (1963). The decision was based on the following cases:
Haile v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225 (1914) ; Graham
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903) ; Lewis v. Holmes,
109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) ; Lafitte v. New Orleans City & L. R.R., 43
La. Ann. 34, 8 So. 701 (1890). These were used to evidence the proposition that
"our courts have rejected the principle which denies recovery for mental pain
and suffering unaccompanied by physical injury to plaintiff and have repeatedly
and consistently permitted recovery in such cases provided it be found the worry
and anguish for which damages are sought was occasioned by breach of a duty
owed plaintiff by defendant and is not predicated solely upon breach of duty
owed a party other than plaintiff." 135 So. 2d at 157. The court concluded:
"We believe the foregoing views neither disturb nor deviate from the rule obtain-
ing in this state to the effect a plaintiff may not recover for mental pain and
anguish occasioned by injury to another. Excepted from said rule, however, are
those instances wherein a plaintiff suing for mental pain and anguish occasioned
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knowledge or foreseeability is exemplified by several Louisiana
decisions, although they do not specifically enunciate the re-
quirement.' In one case a store's failure to timely and properly
deliver a bride's wedding trousseau was the basis of a award for
the humiliation and disappointment caused plaintiff." Similarly,
Western Union's failure to deliver a message announcing the
fatal illness and imminent death of plaintiff's son, which resulted
in mental anguish when plaintiff was deprived of the oppor-
tunity of attending her son during his last illness, was deemed
a sufficient ground for recovery.' 2 Another case allowed dam-
ages for wounded feelings caused by the drilling of an oil well
in a cemetery and the desecration and disturbance to the graves
of plaintiff's near relatives." Recently, this requirement of spe-
cial knowledge or foreseeability was somewhat relaxed when a
pest exterminator who placed poison in a home where children
could reach it was held liable for worry caused the parents as
a result of their believing the poison had been eaten by their
child.' 4 The determining factor in the decision was that the
exterminator, knowing children resided in the home, had placed
poison within their reach but had neglected to determine in
advance the ingredients so that an antidote could be made avail-
able.'5 In each of the cited cases, allowing recovery, the defend-
ant had knowledge which made it foreseeable that grief, sorrow,
or disappointment would result from the conduct. Furthermore,
the Louisiana courts have generally limited recovery for mental
anguish to the victim; third persons generally have not been
allowed recovery for their mental disturbance.1 6
by physical injury to another does so on the breach of a primary legal duty and
obligation owed by the defendant directly to the plaintiff seeking such damages."
Id. at 158. See Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 473 (1963).
10. Humphreys v. Bennet Oil Corp., 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940)
Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903) ; Lewis v.
Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) ; Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
135 So.2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
11. Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) ; accord, Mitchell v.
Shreveport Laundries, 61 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952) (laundry failed to
return only suit of prospective groom in time for his wedding).
12. Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903).
13. Humphreys v. Bennet Oil Corp., 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940) ; cf.
Blanchard v. Brawley Auto Parts Service, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954)
(negligent burning of their father's corpse). Common law courts often base
liability upon a technical trespass to a "property right" in the dead body al-
legedly owned by the plaintiff. E.g., Langford v. West Oakwood Cemetery Addi-
tion, Inc., 223 S.C. 350, 75 S.E.2d 865 (1953).
14. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961), 23 LA. L. REv. 473 (1963). See also note 9 supra.
15. 135 So. 2d at 157.
16. See Knox v. Allen, 4 La. App. 223 (2d Cir. 1926) (parent not allowed
recovery for mental suffering resulting from assault on her child), and other cases
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In the instant case several factors usually considered essen-
tial to liability for mental anguish were absent. Although shoot-
ing a horse with a shotgun is likely to cause sorrow to someone,
there was no showing that the defendant knew or should have
known plaintiff's son would be unusually grieved. Neither was
the injury inflicted in the presence of the plaintiff's son. If the
injury under similar circumstances had been to the child's father,
instead of his horse, prior cases indicate the child would not have
recovered.17
The court based its opinion on several cases'8 which are
distinguishable from the instant case in that they either involved
insult, 9 nuisance,20 shock or fright,21 or wrongful death.22 How-
cited in note 8 supra. But see Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d
145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 473 (1963) ; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS §46(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
17. See note 8 supra.
18. McGee v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944) (mental
anguish and property damage compensable in suit to abate a nuisance); Bourg
v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 120 La. 1009, 45 So. 972 (1908) (mental anguish
due to son's wrongful death) ; Wolf v. Stewart, 48 La. Ann. 1431, 20 So. 908
(1896) (absent aggravating conduct, no recovery for mental anguish occasioned
by additional height of fence) ; M. L. Byrne & Co. v. L. H. Gardner & Co., 33 La.
Ann. 6 (1881) (set out in note 19 infra.) ; Holmes v. Le Cour Corp., 99 So. 2d
467 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958) (recovery for mental anguish caused by seeing
defendant's truck crash into plaintiff's building) ; Pecoraro v. Kopanica, 173 So.
203 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) (falling wall; recovery denied for failure to show
plaintiff was in fear of impending physical injury).
19. M. L. Bryne v. L. H. Gardner & Co., 33 La. Ann. 6 (1881). In this case
the court found insulting conduct in the mode by which an illegal attachment was
executed and stated that the great mortification, annoyance, and vexation caused
the plaintiff were proper subjects in estimating the damages. Insulting conduct
is often the basis for recovery as a form of outrageous conduct.
20. McGee v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944) ; Wolf v.
Stewart, 48 La. Ann. 1431, 20 So. 908 (1896). It is not unusual for courts to
include mental anguish as an element of an interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of property. See PaossER, TORTS § 73 (2d ed. 1955).
21. Holmes v. Le Cour Corp., 99 So. 2d 467 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958)
Pecoraro v. Kopanica, 173 go. 203 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937). The court denied
recovery in Pecoraro, but stated in dictum: "In Louisiana, however, it is settled
that even though there may be no actual objective symptoms of injury, there may
be recovery for nervous shock if the evidence concerning such nervous condition
is sufficient to warrant the belief that such injury was actually sustained." Id. at
204. The court in Holmes allowed relief for fright and shock even though the
damage was only to plaintiff's property. It is recognized that some courts allow
damages for fright and shock if the injury is genuine, but this should not have
affected the outcome of the instant case as there was no fright or shock involved;
plaintiff's son did not discover his mare had been injured until the next day. See
generally Note, 15 LA. L. REv. 451, 459 (1955) for a discussion of fright and
shock cases.
22. Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 120 La. 1009, 45 So. 972 (1908).
Wrongful death actions, under Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, provide
the sole exception to the denial of recovery for mental disturoancc as the result
of negligent conduct primarily affecting a third person. See Notes, 14 LA. L. REV.
713, 715 (1954), 15 LA. L. REV. 451, 461 (1955).
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ever, Brown v. Crocker25 presented the question whether dam-
ages should be available to the owner of a chattel for mental
anguish resulting from an intentional injury to it. Prior to this
case the answer seemed clearly to be that damages could not
exceed the value of the chattel, 24 for monetary awards on the
basis of sentimental value have not been allowed in Louisiana.2 5
It is submitted that relief for mental anguish should have
been denied in the instant case for several reasons: defendant
lacked special knowledge that plaintiff's son would suffer extra-
ordinarily; the mental anguish resulted from conduct which did
not primarily affect the minor son's person; and intentional
injury to chattels does not warrant damages for mental anguish
suffered by the owner.
Byron Kantrow, Jr.
TORTS - STRICT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER
Plaintiff was injured while properly using a combination
power tool purchased by his wife from a retailer as a gift for
him. He sued the retailer and manufacturer of the power tool
for damages, and recovered from the manufacturer on evidence
submitted under allegations of negligence and breach of express
warranties.' Defendant manufacturer contended an action for
breach of express warranty would not lie because of absence of
23. 139 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
24. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 46, comment d at 24 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1957) : "5. A intentionally breaks a valuable vase owned by B, know-
ing the act is certain to distress B. B suffers severe emotional distress. Although
A is liable to B for conversion of the case [vase], his conduct is not so extreme
or outrageous as to make A liable to B for the emotional distress."
25. Huskey v. Maryland Cas. Co., 53 So. 2d 180, 181 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951
("We think the law is well established to the effect that a monetary award can-
not be justified on the basis of sentimental value.") ; Lack v. Anderson, 27 So. 2d
653, 657 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) ("The actual value of the photograph is all
that plaintiff can recover although we realize that no monetary value can ade-
quately compensate him.").
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963).
Plaintiff did not recover from the retailer. Plaintiff's expert witnesses "testified
that inadequate set screws were used to hold parts of the machine together so
that normal vibrations caused the tailstock of the lathe to move away from the
piece of wood being turned permitting it to fly out of the lathe." The court com-
mented that it could not be determined whether the jury's verdict was based on
the negligence or warranty cause of action or both, and said: "The jury could
therefore reasonably have concluded that the manufacturer negligently constructed
the Shopsmith. The jury could also reasonably have concluded that statements in
the manufacturer's brochure were untrue, that they constituted express warranties,
and that plaintiff's injuries were caused by their breach." Ibid.
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